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Jones Ray

ScholarPulse 日报 2026-06-30

2026-06-30 学术简报:2 篇。WorldEvolver通过测试时记忆修订显著提升LLM代理的预测准确性和规划性能。

今日速览

序号标题来源日期主题推荐等级
1Self-Evolving World Models for LLM Agent PlanningarXiv2026-06-29AI-Agent高
2Forensic Trajectory Signatures for Agent Memory Poisoning DetectionarXiv2026-06-29AI-Agent高

重点论文与技术动态

1. Self-Evolving World Models for LLM Agent Planning

一句话结论

WorldEvolver通过测试时记忆修订显著提升LLM代理的预测准确性和规划性能。

核心内容

方法与数据

价值判断

摘要 World models offer a principled way to equip long-horizon LLM agents with foresight: predictions of action consequences before execution. However, unreliable foresight can be ignored, misused, or even degrade downstream decision-making. In this paper, we introduce WorldEvolver, a self-evolving world model framework that revises its deployment-time context while keeping the downstream agent and all model parameters frozen. WorldEvolver integrates three modules: (i) Episodic Memory, which exploits real action transitions through retrieval-based simulation; (ii) Semantic Memory, which extracts persistent heuristic rules from prediction-observation mismatches; and (iii) Selective Foresight, which filters low-confidence predictions before integrating them into agent reasoning context. We evaluate WorldEvolver on ALFWorld and ScienceWorld, measuring world model prediction accuracy on Word2World and downstream agent success rate on AgentBoard. Extensive experiments show that WorldEvolver achieves the highest prediction accuracy across three backbones and leads other world model baselines on downstream agent success rate, demonstrating that test-time memory revision enhances both predictive fidelity and planning performance.

2. Forensic Trajectory Signatures for Agent Memory Poisoning Detection

一句话结论

基于LLM代理内存中毒攻击中的行为不变性,仅通过工具调用轨迹即可实现高精度检测。

核心内容

方法与数据

价值判断

摘要 We discover a behavioral invariant in LLM agents under persistent memory poisoning: in architectures where routing information is retrieved through observable memory-tool invocations, successful attacks require calling memory_recall_fact before email_send_email, a transition that non-exfiltrating sessions rarely exhibit. Under the evaluated architecture, this invariant follows from the attack's information-retrieval dependency rather than being merely an empirical correlation, and suppressing it breaks the attack. A simple rule exploiting this invariant alone achieves AUC = 0.9563. A Random Forest classifier over 19 trajectory features refines it to AUC = 0.9904 (BCa 95% CI [0.987, 0.993], N=10,000 resamples), demonstrating that the attack imprints on multiple independent behavioral channels. The signature is overdetermined: removing all recall-related features (half the feature set) leaves AUC unchanged at 0.990, confirming that memory poisoning induces a distributed trajectory signature rather than a single observable anomaly. Cross-model hold-out on 9 models (7B-120B parameters) confirms AUC = 1.000 on 6/9 hold-out splits, with all three exceptions mechanistically explained. The invariant generalizes to frontier models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4o) without retraining. A strictly prefix-only variant achieves AUC = 0.934, suggesting that real-time blocking is feasible with moderate degradation. The boundary is forensically useful: prompt-injection attacks that bypass memory produce a distinct trajectory (score = 0.541), enabling incident responders to distinguish memory-channel attacks from prompt-injection attacks using tool-call logs alone.